Hypothesis: there is currently an attempt to reconfigure the political model from single-party dominance to a two-pillar system. This is not about copying the United States, but about creating a domestic structure with controlled competition. The general logic is not to dismantle the system, but to redistribute roles and channels of competition within it.
- The old model is worn out
United Russia is holding, but exhausted. CPRF, LDPR, and SRZP are old parties that poorly fit the new generation. - The Kremlin needs not one party, but two pillars
The first is conservative-statist — United Russia.
The second is urban, technocratic, reform-oriented — the “New People” party (NL). - NL becomes the container for the second pillar
Not opposition in the street sense, but a legal systemic alternative. - They are given a starting mass
The rating is publicly raised to trigger the effect: “it is already acceptable to vote for them.”
According to VTsIOM on April 12, 2026:
UR — 27.3%
NL — 12.4%
LDPR — 10.8%
CPRF — 10.9%
Meaning they have already been placed second. - Self-reinforcement begins
People start perceiving the party as a real option. - The party absorbs urban moderates
Small business, technocrats, IT specialists, young managers, and those who “don’t want UR, but don’t want radicals either.” - Old systemic parties are pushed down
CPRF and LDPR become parties of older voters. NL occupies the niche of the second force. - A bipolar Duma forms
UR — conservative center.
NL — liberal-technocratic center. - Managed competition
Two lines: conservatives and modernizers. Without the chaos of the 1990s. - A mechanism for safe turnover
Change not of the regime, but of cabinets, governors, coalitions, prime ministers, and agendas. - This becomes especially necessary during transition
Two parties provide a way to redistribute power without collapse. - Systemic liberals get a legal platform
Not through non-system opposition, but through an embedded party. - A real base forms
Deputies, regions, sponsors, careers, voters. - The party begins to act on its own interests
A layer emerges that defends not only the system but its own positions. - In the long term — bipartisanship
A Russian model: state conservatives vs systemic liberals.
Where we are now
Current stage is 4–6:
— the rating has already been raised;
— the party has already been brought to second place in polling;
— the transformation from a decorative party into a container for the second systemic force is beginning.
In short
The goal is not to dismantle the system, but to transition to a two-pillar model analogous to the US, without losing controllability.
- UR as the party of the conservative tower
- NL as the party of the systemic-liberal tower
- managed bipartisanship
- soft system transition
- gradual real competition within the elite system
Important: both central parties are patriotic and moderate. Essentially, this is left-center and right-center in a logic close to the US. This creates a more stable model and aligns with the existing demand in Russia for stability and moderate change. Competition unfolds within a shared framework, not around revising it.
Argumentation
The argument in favor of this strategy: any complex system must first be launched. Bipartisanship does not arise instantly — it is a growth process. First, a party is created, then it gains support, and only after that does real competition emerge. The logic of radical Westernizers (I was one myself in youth) “institutions first” is rejected here: abrupt implementation of independent rules without a prepared political structure can lead to chaos and loss of stability (especially given current geopolitical risks).
Growth can be initiated from above. If a party receives a noticeable rating, a bandwagon effect occurs: voters begin to perceive it as a real force and vote for it. This accelerates support accumulation and turns an artificially created project into a political organism with its own base.
There are already internal preconditions for such a division. A conditional “second tower” of elites has long been awaiting political expression. The second party becomes a tool for the systemic-liberal wing, creating balance within the existing structure. The role of Vladimir Putin in this model is balancing: adjusting equilibrium between the poles before a future transition.
The claim that this path is invalid due to the “uniqueness” of the American model does not hold. In the US, both parties are also not fully independent. There is a unified elite layer with overlapping interests, and party differences are a form of organizing competition within one system. Therefore, creating two parties in Russia is not a unique experiment, but a reproducible logic.
Some may argue that American bipartisanship grew from independent institutions and cannot be constructed from above. Counterargument: this is a question of stages, not principle. First the party forms, then — as it grows — its autonomy and institutional environment may strengthen. The process is gradual, not instantaneous, which reduces systemic risks.
A separate issue is the control mechanism. In any system, there is an oversight layer. In the US this is institutionalized (for example, the Federal Election Commission), rather than direct control of political competition by security structures. In the Russian model, control is initially stronger and more centralized, but is considered a temporary condition for launching the structure.
Examples from other countries
Historical examples show that managed competition can function and in some cases eventually leads to a more stable state model.
- Mexico (20th century)
The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) dominated for decades.
Competitors such as the National Action Party (PAN) were allowed as a “second track.”
For a long time this was managed competition; real power alternation came only after rule changes and increased autonomy. - Singapore
The People’s Action Party (PAP) dominates.
Opposition exists (e.g., Workers’ Party), but is limited in resources and access.
This results in controlled multipartyism with one stable pillar and a limited second force. - Japan (1955–1993)
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dominated for decades.
Opposition (including the Japan Socialist Party) existed but did not change power.
Real alternation emerged after elite splits and coalition restructuring. - Taiwan
The Kuomintang (KMT) controlled the system.
Opposition was allowed in a limited way.
Real two-party competition emerged after liberalization and the rise of autonomous opposition.
What could go wrong
Putin is an effective balancer and can tune the system at the start. However, there are risks.
- Personalized balance
As long as one center holds the balance, it works. After weakening, an institutional mechanism is needed. Without it, equilibrium dissolves. - Successor problem
A new center may lack the same control and authority. Then the two parties become tools of competing groups. - Imbalance toward one side
One party grows faster or receives more resources → the second does not catch up → return to dominance. - Elite competition becomes public
Groups use parties as levers → conflict becomes less controllable. - Ceiling trap
If constrained — it never becomes an alternative; if released — it exceeds control. Stable balance is difficult. - Cadres and regions
Rapid network and management building is required. Otherwise the party remains a façade. - Economic or external shock
In crisis, space for moderate alternatives shrinks → system hardens → balance worsens. - Trust in procedures
Voters must believe their choice matters. Otherwise ratings do not convert into support.
Balancing the system before transition is possible, but stability depends on establishing rules and mechanisms that maintain equilibrium without personal control. Without this, bipolarity remains a managed construct sensitive to leadership change.
In summary, the model is viable under balance:
enough freedom to grow + enough control to avoid destabilization.
Conclusions
The key risk is the personal nature of the balance. While one center maintains equilibrium, the system works. After weakening, institutional mechanisms are required. Without them, parties become tools of groups rather than stable poles.
However, the core logic remains: first a party is created, then it accumulates support, and only after that institutions can be built. The question is whether the system can fix rules in time and remain between two extremes: total control and uncontrolled imbalance. For the party to become real, some control must be relaxed — but gradually, not instantly.
Intra-elite dynamics already influence the process. Conflicts around public signals and figures (Bonya) indicate struggle among groups over the future model configuration. Some elites benefit from preserving the current structure and may resist the formation of a second pillar.
Overall, this approach aligns with long-standing ideas of gradual system evolution. Given the experience of political transformations in the post-Soviet space, such a scenario appears plausible.
Postscript
If speaking personally — like many, I am tired of shocks. There is no desire to risk the future by handing it to street politicians. In this sense, systemic liberals are acceptable, and I would vote for them (as many in my circle would). The key question was whether they would pass the 5% threshold. The trauma of failing to cross the barrier among those who voted for Yabloko remains. In this regard, boosting NL’s rating in polls was a rational move. Hopefully everything works out.